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STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff-Appellee, ] 
vs. 
TODD SHONTEL WEST, ; 
Defendant-Appellant ] 
i Case No. 980258 - CA 
) Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
TODD SHONTEL WEST 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Todd Shontel West ("West") appeals from a decision of the Fifth Judicial 
District Court in and for Iron County, wherein he was convicted by a jury. West appeals the 
guilty verdict. This Court has jurisdiction over West's appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Was sufficient evidence presented at the trial by the State of Utah to support 
Defendant's conviction? 
2. Did the court err in refusing to suppress all evidence obtained and derived from 
Defendant in and interview on or about April 25, 1997 with then Detective Kenneth Stapley at the 
Utah State Iron County Correctional Facility? 
Standards of Review 
1. In determining whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a conviction 
in a jury trial, the evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. A jury conviction may be reversed for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996); State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991); State v. James. 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Hamilton. 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 
1985); State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
2. In determining whether a trial court has erred in refusing to suppress evidence, the 
standard of review shall be that of whether the trial court was "clearly erroneous" in refusing to 
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do so. Michigan v.Jackson. 475 U.S. 625 (Utah 1986); Brewer v. Williams. 430 U.S. 387; 
Escobedo v. Illinois. 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Carnlev v. Cochran. 369 U.S. 506 (1962). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following Constitutional provisions are determinative in this appeal: 
U.S. CONST, amend VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and the cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favon and to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defense. (Emphasis added) 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12 (in relevant part): 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a conviction dated January 30, 1998 in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court in and for Iron County, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding. At the trial on that date 
West was convicted by a jury of one count of Child Abuse, a Third-Degree Felony. The charge 
stemmed from a broken leg suffered by West's girlfriend's infant daughter in December of 1996. 
West now seeks to overturn his conviction on the grounds that the State of Utah did not present 
sufficient evidence at the trail to support West's conviction. 
II. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
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Defendant Todd Shontel West was charged on April 23
 y 1997, and arrested on April 24, 
1997 for Child Abuse, a Third-Degree Felony, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(2)(b) 
(1953, as amended). West's attorney, William H. Leigh moved to suppress the testimony of 
former Detective Kenneth Stapley based on the contention that Detective Stapley had given West 
improper and ineffective Miranda warnings prior to interrogating West at the Iron County 
Correctional Facility. At the time of the interrogation, West had been deemed indigent, yet 
counsel had not yet been appointed District Court Judge J. Philip Eves refused to suppress 
Detective Stapley's testimony, despite the ineffective Miranda warnings. At the trial on January 
29 and 30, 1998, the State of Utah did not put on any evidence that West hadbeen the 
perpetrator of the crime, and it was clear that not all possible avenues of the cause of the broken 
leg had been investigated. West, an African-American in a predominantly white locale, was found 
guilty by the jury. 
III. Statement of the Facts 
On December 4, 1996, West and his girlfriend, Sarah GrandBois ("GrandBois"), noticed 
that GrandBois' eight-month old daughter, Marquel, was favoring her left leg. After waiting and 
observing Marquel for most of the day, with no change or improvement, GrandBois took Marquel 
to the Emergency Room at Valley View Medical Center, in Cedar City, Utah. Marquel's left leg 
was examined and x-rayed. It was discovered that Marquel had suffered a "spiral fracture" of her 
left tibia. 
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Because of the unusual nature of the injury, particularly in a child of MarquePs age, the 
State of Utah, Division of Family Services conducted an investigation into the possible cause of 
the injury. 
On April 23, 1997, West was charged with the offense of Child Abuse, a Third-Degree 
Felony, alleging specifically that West had inflicted serious injury upon a child, that injury being an 
oblique undisplaced fracture of the left tibia. 
On April 24, 1997, West was arrested on this charge. The arrest was made by four (4) 
police officers, in three cars, including a K-9 unit. 
During the first day of trial on January 29, 1998, West's attorney, William H. Leigh 
(tcLeigh") moved to suppress the testimony of former Detective Kenneth Stapley. Leigh's 
contention was that Stapley had given West insufficient and ineffective Miranda warnings prior to 
interrogating him at the Iron County Correctional Facility, after West's arrest. Specifically, Leigh 
contended that Detective Stapley went through the Miranda warnings very quickly and quietly, 
even slurring his speech to some extent, then slowing back down and talking in a more deliberate, 
and louder tone. West claimed to have been under extreme pressure and fear due to the manner 
of his arrest, and was fearful of not cooperating fully with Detective Stapley's demands. West did 
not fully understand his rights as explained by Detective Stapley, and did not understand that he 
had the right to have an attorney provided to him prior to the interrogation. 
District Court Judge J. Philip Eves denied the motion to suppress, stating that West was 
not entitled to an attorney unless he requested one, and further that he felt as that West had fully 
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understood, and waived his rights, even though he agreed that Detective Stapley's speech had 
been slurred. 
At the trial, the State presented only vague circumstantial evidence that would implicate 
West. The gist of the evidence was that, on the morning in question, December 4, 1996, 
GrandBois got up with MarqueLat approximately 6:00 a.m. GrandBois "played" with Marquel 
until approximately 9:00 a.m., when she then put Marquel down for a nap, and went to watch 
television. GrandBois did not testify, but had previously stated that Marquel had been pulling 
herself up on things, and had not shown signs of injury prior to 9 00 a.m., when GrandBois put 
her down for the nap. At approximately 11:00 a.m.y GrandBois noticed that Marquel was crying 
for a considerable amount of time, and went to check on her At this point, GrandBois apparently 
discovered the injury. 
From this, the State deduced that the injury had occurred sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 
11:00 a.m. West had been outside working on his car, and had made one or two trips into the 
apartment to warm up. West and GrandBois were the only two people who had access to 
Marquel during that time period. 
Detective Stapley testified that West had stated (during the interrogation) that he 
occasionally pulled MarquePs feet out from underneath her to lay Marquel back down in the crib. 
Detective Stapley also testified that West had told him that there was a possibility that he could 
have caused the injury, but that he didn't recall using excessive force or enough force to cause the 
injury. 
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Experts testified for both sides, and all experts involved stated (1) that the break could 
have occurred anywhere from three (3) to seven (7) days prior to December 4, 1996 The experts 
also agreed that such an injury would have caused bruising, swelling, and significant pain. None 
of the doctors who examined Marquel noticed any bruising No evidence was presented that 
Marquel had screamed or shrieked or made any indication of being injured on the morning in 
question In fact, the evidence was to the contrary 
Despite these inconsistencies, the jury returned a guilty verdict 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence introduced at West's trial to support the jury's conviction 
Based on the evidence which was presented to the jury, reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to whether or not Mr West committed this crime The basis for the charge is 
that Mr West was one of only two people who had access to Marquel on the morning in 
question, and that the charge presumably happened that morning However, there was evidence 
presented from both sides that the injury could have been up to a week old. Further, there were 
no additional indicators that Mr West inflicted the injury in the manner that the State claims 
There was no bruising, and most importantly, no screaming or wailing from the baby In looking 
at the evidence as a whole, reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to Mr 
West's guilt with respect to this crime, and the conviction should be overturned 
Mr West's constitutional right to counsel was denied Detective Stapley's Miranda 
warnings were insufficient, particularly in light of the circumstances, to effect a knowing and 
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intentional waiver by Mr. West of his right to an attorney That right attaches when a defendant is 
charged. Thus, Mr. West's right to counsel attached He was not offered counsel. The warnings 
were read in an quick, quiet, slurred manner, and Mr. West was unable to fully understand what 
his rights were with respect to having and attorney present The Court should indulge every 
reasonable presumption against such a waiver. Further, because of the circumstances surrounding 
his arrest and interrogation, Mr. West was frightened, and was unable to give a waiver In the 
alternative to overturning the conviction based on insufficiency of evidence, the Court should 
reverse the case and remand it for a new trial without Detective Stapley's tainted testimony. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS SO INCONCLUSIVE AS 
TO WEST'S GUILT THAT THE JURY MUST HAVE ENTERTAINED A 
REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO HIS GUILT, AND THEREFORE THE 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CONVICTION. 
The State did not present sufficient evidence at the trial on this matter to support West's 
conviction for Child Abuse, and the conviction should therefore be overturned. 
A jury's verdict in a criminal case may be reversed when, as a matter of law, it is 
determined that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction. State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 
649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Harmon. 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)). 
The standard for making such a determination is quite high. A jury's verdict will only be 
reversed if the evidence is so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. Id. (quoting Harman 
at 568,(quoting State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. Hamilton. 827 
P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992); State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
In the present case, the State built its entire case on weak, circumstantial evidence, and the 
jury returned a guilty verdict, even in the face of evidence that was contrary to the State's theory 
of who broke MarquePs leg. The evidence presented was that Ms. GrandBois put Marquel to 
bed at roughly 9:00 a.m., and that MarquePs leg was not injured at that time. GrandBois and 
West noticed that Marquel was favoring the leg at approximately 11:00 a.m. GrandBois and 
West were the only two people at the apartment that day. Evidence was presented that West, on 
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occasion, pulled Marquel down into the crib by her legs whea she was standing up. The jury 
convicted West of child abuse based on those facts regarding the morning in question. Further, 
they did so in light of evidence that (1) the fracture could have been anywhere from four to seven 
days old; (2) the force needed to break Marquel's leg in the manner claimed would have left 
bruising, of which there was none; (3) the infliction of such aa injury oa an eight-month old child 
would elicit screaming or violent crying, of which there was none. Essentially, the jury was faced 
with a fact pattern in which they could not determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, who had caused 
the injury. 
Based on the evidence that was presented at the trial, reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt as to whether this defendant committed the crime of which he was 
charged. Therefore, West's conviction must be overturned based on insufficient evidence to 
support the conviction. 
II. DETECTIVE STAPLEY'S MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE NOT 
SUFFICIENT, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INTERROGATION, 
TO FULLY INFORM WEST OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
West was denied his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel due to the failure of 
Detective Stapley to provide him with_ Miranda warnings that were sufficient under the 
circumstances of the interrogation. West's waiver of assistance of counsel cannot be said to have 
been knowing and voluntary under the circumstances, particularly in light of the manner in which 
Detective Stapley read the Miranda warnings. 
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The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees defendants the right 
to the assistance of counsel for their defense. U.S. CONST, amend. VI. This right is also 
guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12. 
The United States Supreme Court stated, in Michigan v. Jackson. 475 U.S. 625 (1986) 
the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal 
charges, the right to rely on counsel as a "medium" between himself and the State. 
Maine v. Moultoix 474 U.S., at 176 . . . . Indeed, after a formal accusation has 
been made . . . the Constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is of such 
importance that the police may no longer employ techniques for eliciting 
information from an uncounseled defendant. . . 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). 
In the present case, Judge Eves stated, in denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress, that 
ccMr. West clearly was in custody, clearly had the right to have an attorney represent him. But 
he's [West] not entitled to have an attorney appointed unless he requests one." Transcript of Jury 
Trial, State v. Todd Shontel West, page 91-92. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has also 
stated that a defendant's right to counsel does not depend on a specific request for an attorney: 
it was incumbent upon the State to prove "an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst 304, U.S., at 464. 
That standard has been reiterated in many cases. We have said that the right to 
counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant, Carnley v. Cochran. 
368 U.S. 506, 513; of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 471, and that courts 
indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver. . . (Emphasis added). 
Brewery. Williams. 430 U.S. 387, 398. 
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Judge Eves also stated that West had clearly waived his right to have an attorney present 
before questioning or during questioning. See Transcript of Trial at 92. However^ it has been 
"recognized that a waiver of right to counsel is not an intelligent waiver where it is shown to have 
been motivated by a significant degree of fear." United States v. Mohabir. 624 F.2d 1140 (1980 
CA2 NY). '"Thus an alleged waiver of such right is ordinarily viewed with skepticism where it 
takes place in the course of custodial interrogation/ See 21A Am Jur 2d § 761." Id. 
In the case at hand, West was operating under a significant degree of fear. He had been 
arrested by four officers, and a K-9 unit, and he was being interrogated in a back room at the Iron 
County Correctional Facility by a Detective who was exerting enormous amount of pressure on 
him. 
Not only was West's waiver motivated by this fear, his right to assistance of counsel had 
attached, as he had been formally charged with the crime of child abuse prior to Detective 
Stapley's interrogation. Therefore, West was presumptively entitled to have an attorney present 
during the interrogation. As the Court stated, it is incumbent on the State to prove an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Brewer, at 398, quoting Johnson 
v. Zerbst, at 464. 
Because Detective Stapley did not provide West with adequate Miranda warnings, 
because any waiver obtained was motivated by fear, West's constitutional rights to have 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution were violated. Therefore, the fruits of Detective 
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Stapley's interrogation (Stapley's testimony) should have been excluded The Court erred in 
denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress, and the case should be reversed and remanded back to 
the trial court for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The State did not introduce sufficient evidence at West's trial to support the jury's 
conviction. Although the standard for reversal is high, this case meets that standard. Based on 
the evidence which was presented to the jury, reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to whether or not Mr. West committed this crime. If nothing else, they must 
have wondered if perhaps Ms. GrandBois accidentally injured the child^ and Mr. West was simply 
covering for her. After all, there were no other witnesses. There was no one else who saw 
Marquel pulling herself up on the coffee table just before Ms. GrandBois put her down for a nap. 
There is no one to validate her story. Further, when the evidence regarding what should have 
happened if Mr. West had injured the child as the State claimed, yet did not happen is taken into 
account, reasonable minds must have entertained even more doubt. If Mr. West fractured 
Marquel's leg that morning, where is the bruising that the experts all stated should have been 
there? Where is the excessive swelling? And most importantly, each expert testified that the pain 
would have been excruciating. Where are the screams of a baby who has just had her leg 
broken? 
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Mr. West was also denied his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel in and during 
the interrogation by Detective Stapley. Detective Stapley read Mr. West his Miranda warnings in 
a quick, quiet tone, slurring his speech as he went. Then he slowed down and spoke deliberately 
for the remainder of the interview. Mr. West had been charged, his right to counsel had attached. 
He was not required to request an attorney, as Judge Eves stated. He was required to give a 
voluntary and knowing waiver. Because of the circumstances surrounding his arrest and the 
subsequent interrogation, Mr. West was afraid. He was unable to give a voluntary, knowing and 
intentional waiver. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "Courts[are to] indulge in 
every reasonable presumption against waiver." That standard is applicable in this case. Without 
fully understanding his rights, West could not intentionally waive those rights. Therefore, the 
interrogation was improper and the evidence taken therefrom should have been suppressed. 
Accordingly, this Court should overturn West's conviction based on insufficiency of 
evidence. In the alternative, the Court should reverse and remand for a new trial with an order 
that Detective Stapley's testimony be suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this A? day of October, 1998. 
DANIEL T.A. COTTS, P.C. 
DANIEL T A COTTS, ESQ. 
Attorney for Appellant 
14 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 2^ " day of October, 1998,1 mailed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT TODD SHONTEL WEST, postage pre-paid 
to: 
Scott M. Burns 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, UTS4720 . . ^ ^ 
Janiel T.A. Cotts 
15 
ADDENDUM 
17 
TABLE OF CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM 
1. Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, 
and Commitment 001 
2. Notice of Appeal 004 
18 
SCOTT M. BURNS (#4283) 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-6694 
Telecopier: (435) 586-2737 
FILED 
APR 1 0 1998 
5th DISTRICT COUR1 
IRON O O l " L , w 
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TODD SHONTEL WEST, 
Defendant. 
) JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, 
AND COMMITMENT 
) 
) 
) Criminal No 971500369 
) Judge J Philip Eves 
The Defendant, TODD SHONTEL WEST, having been convicted, by jury verdict, of CHILD 
ABUSE, a Third-Degree Felony, on January 30, 1998, and the Court having entered said verdict of 
guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report, and after 
said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the above-entitled matter having come on for 
sentencing on April 6, 1998, in Parowan, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, TODD SHONTEL 
WEST, having appeared before the Court in person together with his attorney of record, William 
Leigh, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns, 
and the Court having reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report and thereafter having heard 
statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Iron County Attorney, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, 
to wit: 
/ ^> /^ \ n=sv^v7 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, TODD 
SHONTEL WEST, has been convicted by jury verdict of CHILD ABUSE, a Third-Degree Felony, 
and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment 
should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the 
Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, TODD SHONTEL WEST, and pursuant to 
his conviction of CHILD ABUSE, a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of 
incarceration in the Utah State Prison for a period of no less than zero (0) years and not to exceed 
five (5) years and the Defendant is hereby placed in custody of the Utah State Department of 
Corrections. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no fine shall be imposed 
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED, to the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, that the 
Defendant be required to pay restitution to Medicare, in the amount of one hundred and thirteen 
($113.00) dollars, joint and several with co-Defendant SARAH GRANDBOIS, as a term and 
condition of any parole the Defendant may receive. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, TODD SHONTEL WEST, 
and deliver him to the Utah State Prison, there to be held under the provisions of the foregoing 
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
OD-%-
DATED this fO -day of April, 1998 
(Z*>-64.— 
J PHILIP EVES 
District Court Judgfc 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAI 
COUNTY OF IRON' 
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the original Judgment, 
Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs Todd Shontel West. Criminal No 
971500369, now on file and of record in my office 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah, 
this 10 day of April, 1998 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
A_ ( S E A L ) V ^ x & ^ ^ T 
l
^ fQ c £ > > 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
District Court Clerk 
Deputy District Court Clerk 
DP-3-
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
William H. Leigh -#5307 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
FILED 
F ' F ^ DISTRICT COURT 
'98 HftV 7 Pn 12 51 
IRON -.OuNTY 
BY 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TODD SHONTEL WEST, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 971500369FS 
Honorable J. Philip Eves 
Notice is hereby given that Defendant, Todd Shontel West, by and through counsel, William 
H. Leigh appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the jury verdict of child abuse, a third degree felony, 
on January 30, 1998, and the Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, being executed and entered on 
April 10, 1998 with respect to the jury verdict. 
DATED this / day of May, 1998. 
\ 
WILLIAM H. LEIGH / 
Attorney for Defendant 
Oo^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
document to Mr. Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, at P.O. Box 428, Cedar City, Utah 84721-
0428, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, this _3±i day of May, 1998. 
Secretary 
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